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- Paper delivered for the ESRC-Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge -  
 
By Robert Salais  
(IDHE, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Paris) 
 
 
 
The “ economics of conventions ” is a collective and multisided program of research in 
economics (with cognate developments in other social sciences) which is going on in France 
since more than ten years. The two seminal collective books (in French) are: Robert Salais and 
Laurent Thévenot, eds., 1986, Le travail. Marchés, règles, conventions, Paris, Economica; and 
the special issue “L’économie des conventions” of the Revue économique, March 1989, vol. 
40 (2) with Jean-Pierre Dupuy, François Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereau, André Orléan, 
Robert Salais and Laurent Thévenot. Of course there has been many more recent 
developments (mostly in French; see the short list of Anglo-Saxon references at the end of the 
paper). The economics of convention now begins to be internationally known. I must say that 
there are some (in my view prejudicial) confusions. Our program of research has almost 
nothing to share with evolutionary games that some people like Peyton try to label as 
“economics of convention” in the Anglo-Saxon literature. Primacy must be acknowledged to 
the French school. 
I.D.H.E.
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I.  General comments 
 
In the modern era of diversity, flexibility, innovation, autonomy, and globalisation, our group 
of researchers was aware that well-established methodologies and political postures will no 
longer work. The imperialist conception of the market extending its sphere of domination over 
all the aspects of economic and social life was not acceptable, nor the only consideration of 
macro phenomena. And to denounce and to criticise the market is not doing something new, 
because it is only the negative of the same thing. Thus the route we decided to explore (and it 
will take time, years and need many people to make research; success is not guaranteed) is to 
build up positive constructions, new in some respects (though other trials are of course 
engaged). There four central positive assumptions (in disorder): 
 
1. There exists a plurality of forms of coordination, of products, of type of works, of 
principles of public action, of ways for constructing justice and the common goods. It is 
not simply an empirical diversity; it implies diverse types of generality; that people could 
share and know (by experience or by theory). The market is only an element among a set 
of possible forms of coordination. To positively build up a plurality of forms of 
coordination allows to criticise market ideology, not from an external point of view, but 
from an other ideal-type of the same importance. If one’s refers to the well-known 
opposition between market and organisation, it means that, like the various forms of 
organisation, the market is not existing per se; it is constructed by conventions, notably the 
standards which define for the products the quality on which producers and users tacitly or 
explicitly agreed. There are different possible ways to be both efficient and fair. 
  
2. As modern economies involve a pervasive and widespread uncertainty, to be achieved 
individual action needs a common framework with others. But not, strictly speaking, an ex 
ante and predefined framework imposed to everybody by a set of global institutions. 
Something more sophisticated is required: each individual action, when undertaken and by 
this undertaking, presupposes some definite common framework shared with others. She 
presupposes a world, common with other people engaged in the same coordination. That is 
the core of the conventions that are supposed to apply to the situation at stake. Generally 
this is a little world (a workshop, the brief moment of some instantaneous exchange on the 
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market), not to difficult to grasp with. The scope of that world and the way it is designed 
depends of the nature of the searched outcome and of the problems or conflicts that will be 
met. Probably this needs institutions to support the process, but of a kind different from 
the standard one (I will briefly come back to this point at the end). 
 
3. The main focus is not on institutions that regulate, but on the ways individual actions are 
coordinated and mutually expected. This derives from the concept of convention. For 
instance in a work coordination inside a firm, conventions are things, outcomes, rules of 
behaviour that other people are expecting you will do or follow. They judge your action, 
its relevance or irrelevance by reference to these conventions. The same could be said for 
coordination and competition between firms: they are conform to some expected standards 
or customs, expected because past experience proved that they are workable. If there is no 
definite reason to think that things could go differently (as Keynes himself emphasised in 
his famous chapter 12 from the General Theory), everybody or every firm will continue to 
observe and to assess others’ actions through these conventions. Because doing differently 
is costly and risky and, in most circumstances, unnecessary. One’s must have good reasons 
to do differently and to put new claims, i.e. general and legitimate reasons with which it is 
difficult for everybody to disagree. Thus, what is antecedent is not institutions, but the 
conventions which in daily affairs help people coordinating in a right way. 
 
Note that the same arguments were more or less developed by Piore and Doeringer in their 
works on labour market segmentation. They argued that, for the groups of skilled workers in 
large capitalist industries, the rules of work were, above all, customs, habits supposed to be 
known by others and that these “conventions” (so to speak) were used as tests of identity 
among workers. In many respects, officials rules developed as an institutionalisation of 
professional customs, with the implicit agreement of workers. This is close to our arguments. 
  
4. Equally due to radical uncertainty, people cannot undertake the complex strategic 
computation that standard economics assumes to be rational. More than that, standard 
rationality would be inefficient. For people it is more efficient to be pragmatic. Thus our 
assumption of rationality is the following one. People know first that they are not 
omniscient and, secondly, that to achieve their goals they must take in consideration other 
people and collective goals and values. There is some parallel with Rawls’s position who 
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emphasises that, to act efficiently, people have to manifest to others that their actions refer 
to some acceptable general principle of justice. Our theoretical assumption is that people 
are reasonable, more than rational. It has of course to be tested by empirical works. We 
shall suggest below that more than a strategic process, the process of work (that is the 
coordination between people at work) can be understood as a pragmatic process (filled up 
with mutual adjustments and also adjustments to rules and to the machinery, all these 
adjustments having to cope with unpredictable circumstances). The interest of this 
assumption is that you could study how pragmatic processes eventually degenerate into 
strategic market processes. The opposite is not true.  
 
II. Application to labour economics 
 
All of this nicely applies to work, due to its very specific nature made with singularity, time, 
creation of new realities, pervasive uncertainty, and so on. 
 
1. To elaborate a little bit more, one’s must start from the double failure of market theories 
when they tried to cope with work. The first time they meet, what is exchanged between a 
worker and an employer? Standard theories tell us that they exchange a commodity, whose 
name is “work”. Heterodox theories, namely the radical and marxist ones, tell us that they 
market “labour power”: as a horse-power machine, the worker is supposed to sell the disposal 
of his power to the employer. Our assessment is that the debates between these two positions 
are endless and unfruitful and that an other conception must be built. 
 
What are the failures?  
 
Marx in his Capital offered a definite criticism of the first position, that there exists a market 
for “work”. It was my point of departure in my 1989 contribution. I quote Marx: “To be sold 
on the market as a commodity, work should in any case exist before. But if the worker could 
give to his work a material existence, separated and independent from his person, he would 
sell commodity, not work” (Marx, 1867, book 1, section 6, chapter 19). A little bit further, he 
added in a footnote: “If you call work a commodity, it is not like a commodity which is first 
made in order to be exchanged and then brought to the market (to be exchanged against other 
commodities). Work is created only when brought to the market. We can even say that work is 
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brought to the market before being created”. Thus “work” cannot exist as a commodity. What 
can only exist is the product of work. In other words what exists is the material and singular 
outcome of work activities of workers who coordinate their actions in the sphere of 
production towards a specific product. Note that we consider that services themselves have 
some material inscription somewhere (for instance in improvement or modification in the 
customer’s situation). Our concept of product is thus general; it a priori covers all industries.  
 
Following Marx, work is not a substance which can be objectively measured. Can labour 
power be an adequate substitute for market exchange? Can it be measured? Symmetric 
difficulties arise, in relation with the second position assuming the existence of a market for 
labour power (or, if you prefer, for human capital). The relation between wage and 
productivity has been extensively discussed. What is striking is that opposite proposals are 
both supported with good arguments and some evidence. One proposal is that productivity is a 
positive function of the amount of human capital possessed by an individual who invested in 
it and receives higher wage (human capital being the neo-classical translation for labour 
power). In this view the hierarchy of wages must be explained by human capital 
differentiation. The opposite view is that higher wages is an incentive in favour of higher 
effort and productivity. In this conception the hierarchy of individual productivity is explained 
by wage differentiation: the apparent correlation between wage and human capital is a pure 
signalling effect. The idea is that, being uncertain on the quality of work, employers give 
provisionally some credit to diplomas and other general indicators of quality (which in reality 
have no relation with whatsoever substantial productivity). 
 
Thus, if neither work, nor labour power could be the basis for market theory or for empirical 
evidence, the only way opened is to consider work hiring, work activities and labour 
adjustments in firms (and the complex unity the three are constituting) as a matter for 
coordination by conventions between workers and between workers and employers. That is, 
people at work have mutual expectations about the ways other people have to work and 
actually work; and them and the employer form mutual expectation about fairness and 
efficiency. A priori this statement is shocking; usually one’s speaks of constraints, power, 
unilateral authority, hierarchy. At the reverse, coordination and conventions speak of implicit 
agreements between people, emphasising something like this: that everybody prefers adhering 
to his own beliefs about the ways things seem going on, more than revealing the hard realities 
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to himself and to others, at least as long as nothing happens which explicitly contradicts his 
beliefs. Assuming that wage rules, classifications, standards are conventions simply means 
that the meaning and content of these rules are given by pragmatic interactions. They are 
accepted because they work: in that sense they are objective. But by the same process, they are 
in permanence submitted to interpretation and to innovation. Finally, these assumptions do not 
exclude that power relations and inequalities in bargaining power are at work in these 
interactions and that these relations and inequalities influence the definition of conventions. 
They simply mean that hegemony cannot be total and imposed uniquely unilaterally by 
strength relations. Hegemony is always a compromise between different worlds and 
principles. It takes the forms of rules and of objective descriptions which apparently manage a 
balance between interests and could be accepted as such.  
 
2. Before providing more details, there is a major evidence in favour of a “conventional” 
treatment for work: the firm accountings and more largely its rules of organisation. 
Accounting qualifies the realities of the firm for its participants; it measures, it provides 
variables (wages, profitability, costs, prices, the number of employees, etc.) and ratios for 
managing the firm, for formulating claims, etc. More generally, the rules of organisation 
define tasks to be done, mobility, wage formula, promotion, lays off, etc. Are rules the true 
objective reality or, even if they can be sometimes contested, are they constructing a common 
reality for people living and working in the firm. Clearly the latter position is the right one. 
Everybody takes for granted this informed reality of the firm. Nevertheless it is a constructed 
reality. At a more fundamental level, it must be noticed that work has two different measures 
in firm accountings, both true: wage and added value. The wage is the counterpart for work 
effort (and an important daily issue about fairness). The added value measures the extent and 
quality of work incorporated in the final product. It could be argued that added value is the 
right evaluation of work and the true basis for labour claims. For the wage is only a share of 
the added value. Nevertheless due to the distribution of property rights in capitalism, most of 
the demands are about wages, not about value added. Wages appear as a cost and profit as the 
remuneration for the employer. Marx was aware of this double nature and fundamental 
ambiguity of salaried work. Workers conflict with the employer about the sharing of value 
added, and they cooperate with him to obtain a product which could be the support of higher 
value added. This is what means coordination for us, a inextricable mix of cooperation and 
conflict (for each worker and in the course of his work activities). Work conventions are 
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fundamentally marked by this ambiguity and this mixing. One’s could say that conventions 
instrument for people at work a compromise between two principles of equivalence, the one 
making equivalent wage and work, the other making equivalence between work and its 
product. But some refinement is needed.  
 
3. How to reassess these phenomena in the terms of an economics of conventions?  
 
The work relation escapes to any market paradigm for two reasons. First, it occurs through 
time. Basically the relation is dynamic: the deliverance of work needs time, and a time 
posterior to exchange between the worker and the employer. Second, the true object of 
exchange is not work, but the (very material and singular) product of work. No partner is 
interested by work. What matters is the product. Only when the product is sold on its market, 
can profits and wages be obtained and remunerate employer and workers. But hiring has first 
to be achieved, for no work means no product and no value created. As the product does not 
exist when exchange occurs (and when the contract is signed), a substitute must be used at this 
exchange. Both reasons have as a consequence the radical uncertainty (about the future, the 
intentions of the other contractor, the quality and cost of the product) that governs the 
situation for its participants. Actors must cope with this uncertainty and find solutions to 
overcome it. Uncertainty is not ignorance; there are multiple ways for dealing with it. 
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For the actors of the work relation, uncertainty is overcome by two complementary 
conventions (or sets of conventions). The first one is the convention of productivity, the 
second one the convention distributing the responsibility vis-à-vis economic hazards (that I 
called convention of unemployment in my first works). In some way, the scheme 1 
theoretically describes how uncertainty is endogenously structured by and within the work 
relation. It describes how the participants to the relation are expecting the things will move on 
and by the same way, if everything seems OK, it describes how things are actually moving on. 
There are three moments in the course of work coordination. They are connected each other 
both by expectations and, progressively, by individual actions. These moments are: hiring, the 
process of production and the acceptance of the product by market’s buyers. At moment 1, 
wage is offered against future worktime and effort to come after. At moment 2, effort and 
quality of work are delivered and transformed, via coordination, into a final product. At 
moment 3, the product is tested by the market: is-it conform or not to buyers’ expectations?  
 
Moment 1 plus moment 2 are the domains for conventions of productivity. The first 
equivalence (wage against future time) is used to obtain the second one (work time against 
final product with expected standards of quality and costs). As I explained above, these 
conventions are supported by organisational rules. Moment 3 is the domain for conventions of 
unemployment. The quality of the product and, by the same way, the quality of the delivered 
work are market-tested. Some deviation can appear between expectations and achievement in 
these respects, even if standards of quality of work and of effort have been correctly achieved. 
Markets have changed their views. New standards of quality are required. Thus some 
adjustment is needed, that does not destabilise the conventions of productivity within the firm. 
The issues at stake are: who supports the adjustment? Is-it shared and, if so, along what 
distribution of responsibilities? Does-it concern wage, time of work, profit, the level of 
employment? As for conventions of productivity, there are diverse possible arrangements: 
work sharing, redundancies, lays off, retraining of the labour force, and so on, that are 
observable. 
 
Conventions of productivity and of unemployment are closely and dynamically linked. The 
latter conventions rule distribution issues and the former ones efficiency problems. But at each 
stage of the process there are expectations about outcomes from the part of all participants. 
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Thus expectations about distribution play a role in work deliverance and its efficiency; 
reciprocally expectations about efficiency inform the chosen rules of distribution. So doing, 
one’s disagrees with the standard view which considers that justice issues are purely 
distributive, social and opposed to economic issues. Fundamentally the link between 
efficiency and justice is positive and reciprocal; the very problem is that there exists different 
possible ways for constructing this link. 
 
4. Empirical examples 
 
Further developments (see for instance Storper and Salais, 1997) focus on the key links 
between work and product of work. We distinguish several worlds of production, each being 
an ideal-type of product and of work coordination to achieve that ideal-typical product. 
Conventions of productivity and of unemployment differ from one world to the other. 
Empirical studies have been made, some using samples of individual firm data (accountings 
and qualitative description of their processes of modernisation); other studies focus on hiring 
processes, on monographs on industries or firms or territories or networks of firms, etc.  
 
Other studies focus on the diverse ways by which law could be used as a resource in labour 
conflicts, the possibility to rely on arbitration procedures or on rights of action in front of a 
court of justice. And I would like not to forget historical researches we made, for France and, 
after, by comparison between France and Great-Britain (Whiteside and Salais, 1998) and with 
Germany, to seize unemployment as a convention, notably the statistical categories, the 
principles of public action for employment. National diversity on this respect is rooted in sets 
of different conventions and values. The statement that the rate of unemployment is lower in 
Great-Britain than in France must be carefully scrutinised. It is not so much that employment 
policies in Great-Britain are better than that the British tradition focuses on individual 
responsibility and market decentralisation. A long and important support to people searching 
employment would be counterproductive and would create social dependency. In trade or 
employer unions or in political parties, almost everybody considers that these are the right 
conventions, what everybody has to mutually expect from others. In France, the responsibility 
for the State, expected by all, is to create employment by macro policies and to provide 
support to people until they find a job. The conventions are different and, as a consequence, 
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the reality of unemployment itself. It is not a question of good or bad policies; each policy has 
its own criteria for evaluating fairness and efficiency.  
 
This explains why it is difficult to predict what effective outcomes public policies could have. 
It is easy to make a prediction in purely normative terms by using models. But the reality will 
depend, partly at least, of the ways actors will interpret and react in context to that policy. 
Again one’s must be aware that their conventions will play a role in the process of 
implementation. For instance, the creation of a minimum wage in Britain will have different 
effects, depending of the conventions that will dominate. If everybody or the dominant actors 
believe that the true competition is on costs and prices and that a compulsory minimum wage 
will put them in economic difficulties, job reductions will occur. But if there is an agreement 
that times now are to invest in human capital in order to be more productive and to 
compensate the lack of wage flexibility, the economy could create more jobs and more good 
jobs in new products and industries. 
 
The whole set of studies tries to emphasise diversity, the openness and, to some extent, 
indeterminacy of the dynamics of development or of crisis. These studies pay attention to 
intermediary levels of coordination (industry, territory, network) as the relevant levels to study 
and to make public policies. More and more, these coordinations are transnational and are 
waiting for adequate public rules. This should precisely be a right concern for Europe. In 
studies we made on the implementation of a social dimension for Europe, we emphasise the 
crucial role of these intermediary levels (which transcend national frontiers) in elaborating fair 
social and employment standards. The mechanism of the European Social Dialogue is 
interesting in this respect. Roughly speaking, this mechanism creates incentives for social 
actors (unions and employers’ organisations at European level) to deliberate about the 
adequate norms that meet both requirements of flexibility and workers’ needs for freedom and 
thus can be the basis for European social law. Our approach helps understanding that the point 
at stake is not “soft law” – that is a law negotiated a minima between private interests. It 
concerns the discovering of the right way to implement and to make operative the European 
objective of, for instance, “to improve living and working conditions” (Article 136 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty). The basic premise of this mechanism is that, by their actions and their 
conventions of coordination, economic and social actors possess the practical knowledge 
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required for dealing with these norms. This constitutes a focal point for economic and law 
researches.  
  
III. Proximity with and difference from other approaches 
 
With institutional economics (for instance internal markets or labour segmentation), the 
convention approach shares the same focus on organisational rules and on their distribution 
effects (hierarchies of wages, stability or precariousness of work relations). But it is less 
immediately institutional, if I could say. Primacy is given to action and to coordination. We 
try to leave room for some space for freedom, initiative, unpredictable bifurcation in dynamic 
and collective processes (for example, via the possible diverse interpretations people can do 
for the same conventions). For us institutions are needed and acting only in case of 
coordination failures, that are explicitly acknowledged and advocated as such by actors. And 
we pay more attention to the plurality. 
 
With extended standard economics, we share, to some extent only, similar preoccupation 
about individual action and about forms of agreement. But we completely disagree on 
rationality and the role of the collective. 
 
With regulation theories, we emphasise the role of labour, and, by contrast, the importance of 
property rights. And equally we pay attention to state action and public policies. But macro 
holism or optimal models are not our affair, as I insisted above. It is preferable to keep some 
unstable balance between what must be considered as inescapable tensions or contradictions 
(that are the salt of life and of economy). Researchers have not to propose solutions or 
ideologies. They simply have to be part of a collective process of reflexivity, of knowledge, 
and more generally to be part of a process of pragmatic revision of institutions which govern 
the economy. Vis-à-vis social and public actors, their role could be to make visible and 
publicly debatable what are the implications or the principles of public action, the coherence 
or incoherence, or the categories that implicitly underline their action or proposals. 
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